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21.  Introduction
Since Schumpeter’s (1942, Ch. 8) seminal conjectures about the importance of internal
finance for innovation, much effort has been devoted to theoretically and empirically
investigating the influence of financial constraints on the innovative behavior of firms.
Modern theoretical models suggest that R&D expenditures must be funded primarily by
internal finance due to the existence of information asymmetries between innovative firms
and the suppliers of external funds.
Stiglitz, Weiss (1981) analyze the effects of moral hazard and adverse selection in debt
markets and explain why lenders may deny a loan agreement even if the project is profitable.
Adverse selection problems arise because of asymmetric information about the risk
characteristics and the default probabilities of firms’ investment projects. Lenders may ration
credit rather than accept a higher interest rate to clear the market because increases in the
interest rate induce the low risk borrowers to exit the pool of applicants first. In addition,
borrowers whose actions cannot be monitored by lenders, have an intrinsic incentive to invest
in riskier, higher-return projects that increase the probability of bankruptcy. It is primarily for
this moral hazard problem that equity rather than debt is considered the natural source of
external finance for firms investing in risky R&D projects.
Like debt markets, however, equity markets are also characterized by serious adverse
selection problems. Myers, Majluf (1984) analyze the effect of adverse selection on the
market for new share issues and explain why firms may be forced to sell equity at a discount
if they can sell it at all. If in addition, no venture capital is available, firms are forced to self
finance their R&D projects.
There is a large empirical literature on internal finance and physical investment.1 However,
there are only few attempts to investigate the influence of financial constraints on R&D
investment (see, e.g., Hao, Jaffe 1993, Himmelberg, Petersen 1994, Harhoff 1998, Bond,
Harhoff, Van Reenen 1999). All of these studies are concerned with the manufacturing sector.
Since the importance of the services sector is continuously increasing, it seems worthwhile to
investigate the role of financial constraints on the innovative behavior of firms in this sector.
Using newly available data at the firm level, this paper provides some evidence of the
importance of financial constraints in explaining the timing of innovations in the German
services sector. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present a
                                               
1 See, e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen (1988), Devereux, Schiantarelli (1989), Hoshi, Kashyap, Scharfstein
(1991), and, for excellent surveys Schiantarelli (1996) and Hubbard (1998).
3dynamic model of innovation, explaining the timing of an innovation in terms of financial
constraints, technological opportunities, profit expectations, and current profits. In Section 3
we derive a tractable econometric specification which can be estimated using qualitative
dependent variable models. A description of the data is given in Section 4. Section 5 presents
the empirical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2.  The Theoretical Model
Following Kamien, Schwartz (1982, Ch. 4), we consider a firm investing in a new technology
or in a new product to replace its current technology or product, respectively. The firm has to
calculate whether the R&D project is worthwhile and, if so, has to determine the innovation
date and the R&D expenditure spending plan that will maximize the present value of profits.
We assume that the firm realizes a profit stream at the constant rate v>0 per unit of time. This
profit stream continues until the product or the process in use is displaced by the firm’s
innovation at time T. From this time on, the further profit stream is assumed to have the gross
capitalized value V when discounted with the constant interest rate r to the innovation time.
Each innovation requires a certain amount of technological knowledge z which can be
accumulated by investing in R&D expenditures x according to the concave function
(1) ( ) ( ) , .z t x t= < <α α0 1
The firm specific parameter α reflects the decreasing returns to faster spending at each point
in time. At the beginning of the project, the knowledge necessary for the innovation is
assumed to be negligible. The project is finished as soon as the critical knowledge level Z is
reached. These assumptions correspond to the fixed endpoint conditions
(2) z z T Z( ) , ( )0 0= = .
Liquidity b is augmented by the stream of interest earnings r⋅b and the current flow profits v,
but is reduced by R&D expenditures x. This results in the differential equation
(3) ( ) ( ) ( ).b t rb t v x t= + −
Due to the discussed adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the equity and debt
markets, the firm is financially constrained if it is not able to internally finance its research
project. Thus, the liquidity conditions are given by
(4) b B b t t T( ) , ( )0 0 0 0= ≥ ≥ ∀ < ≤ .
4The optimal innovation date and the optimal time path of R&D are determined by the
maximization of the discounted innovation profit function
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subject to the constraints (1) to (4). The maximization problem can be solved in two steps. We
first determine the time path of R&D, depending on the innovation date, and then calculate
the optimal timing of an innovation. The Hamiltonian of the control problem with T fixed is
given by
H e v x t x t rb t v x trt= − + + + −− ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))ψ ψα1 2 ,
where Ψ1 and Ψ2 are the costate variables of the state variables z and b. The necessary first
order conditions are given by
(6) Hx rte x t= − + − =− −ψ α ψα1 1 2 0( )
(7) Hz = = −  =0 1 1 1ψ ψ ψ
(8) Hb rtr e= = −  = −ψ ψ ψ ψ2 2 2 2
with ψ1  and ψ2  constant. The nonnegativity condition for b is given by
(9) b T T b T T( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( )≥ ≥ =0 0 02 2ψ ψ ,
The transbersality condition by
v x T x t rb T v x T re VrT− + + + − − =−( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ))ψ ψα1 2 0 .
Since the Hamiltonian is concave in x and b, these necessary conditions are also sufficient for
optimality. Substituting from (7) and (8) into (6) yields
(10) x t ert( ) /= + −α ψ ψ α1 2
1/ 1
1b g
b g
and thus the constant growth rate
(11) x / x = r / (1- )α ,
regardless of whether a financial constraint is binding or not. It follows from the result that
the growth rate of R&D expenditures exceeds the interest rate that in an optimal R&D
5program, liquidity will never become zero before the project is completed, i.e. b(t)>0 ∀
0<t<T.
Integrating (11) and using the accumulation function (1) together with the boundary
conditions (2) yields the optimal R&D expenditure plan
(12) x t e er T r t( ) ~ ( )~ / /( )= − − −(r Z)1/α α α α α1 1 1 ;   0≤t≤T,
with ~ / ( )α α α≡ −1 . The discounted present values of R&D costs and rents of the new
innovation are then determined by
(13) x Z r eD r T= − −1/ 1/ 1/1α α α αα( ~) ( )~ ~ ~
and
 (14) V V v r eD rT= − −( / ) .
As can be seen from Figure 1, both discounted values are decreasing functions in time T.
Figure 1: Optimal Timing of Innovations with Non-Binding and Binding
Financial Constraints
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The time path of liquidity can be derived by integrating the differential equation (3) and
inserting the starting condition b(0)=B from (4) as
(15) b t Be e v r r Z e e ert rt r T r t rt( ) ( ) / ( ~) ( ) ( )/ ~ / ~ / /( )= + − − − −− −1 11 1 1 1α α α α α α ;   0≤t≤T.
6At the innovation date T, the liquidity function (15) takes the value
(16) b T) Be e v r e r Z erT rT rT r T( ( ) / ( ~) ( )/ ~ / ~ / ~= + − − − −1 11 1 1α α α α α .
Let us first assume that the financial constraint is not binding, i.e. b(T)≥0 and hence ψ2 =0.
Then the firm will maximize its reduced profit function
(17) π αα α α α= + − − −− − −max ( ) / ( ~) ( )/ / ~ ~ / ~
T
rT rT r Te V e v r Z r e1 11 1 1n s .
Rearranging the first order condition ∂π ∂ =/ T 0  yields the solution function
(18) T r* ( ~) ln ;= − −α β1    β α α α≡ − −−1 1( ~) / /r Z V v r ,
which is characterized by the comparative statics
(19) ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂T B T Z T V T v* / , * / , * / , * /= ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ < >0 0 0 0 .
Hence, the discounted present value of R&D costs in (13) can be expressed by
x V v rD = − −( / ) ( )~β βα1/ 1 , the discounted present value of innovation rents in (14) by
V V v rD = −( / ) ~β α1/ , and finally the discounted present value of innovation profits in (17)
by π β α= −( / ) /V v r 1 . Since superiority of new innovations generally imply V>v/r, the
necessary and sufficient condition for undertaking the R&D project at all is β>0, i.e.
(20) V v r r Z> +/ ( ~) / ~ /α α α1 1 .
If condition (20) holds, the R&D project is undertaken, independent of whether the financial
constraint is binding or not. This can be seen from Figure 1, where the functions of the
discounted costs and discounted rents are graphically presented. Obviously, the only impact
of financial constraints is to postpone the optimal timing of the innovation from T* to TR*.
The optimal innovation time TR* is then determined by b(TR*)=0 in (16). Unfortunately, this
equation cannot be explicitly solved for TR*. Nevertheless, the comparative statics
(21) ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂T B T Z T V T vR R R R* * * */ , / , / , /< ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ = <0 0 0 0
are unambiguous. If the starting point of the research project and unobserved heterogeneities
of firms determining α are treated as random, condition (20) and the comparative statics in
(19) and (21) indicate that the probability of a planned innovation within a specific time
interval from the present depends negatively on technological difficulties as measured by Z.
The impacts of liquidity B, the value of the innovation V, and the current profit stream v on
the innovation probability depend on whether the firm is financially constrained or not. If
there is no liquidity constraint, B does not matter, but the innovation probability increases
7with increasing V. In addition, the larger the profit stream v is, the smaller is the innovation
probability since a further innovation would destroy the rents realized from the existent goods
and services. However, if there is a financial constraint, the innovation probability increases
with liquidity B and with the profit stream v since the constraint becomes less binding, but it
does not depend on innovation profits V. 2
3.  Econometric Specification
According to the theoretical model, each firm decides on the optimal time of an innovation
T T TR** max *,
*
= m r , depending on whether the financing constraint is binding or not. In our
data set, the firms´ decisions on the timing of their innovations cannot be observed directly.
Instead, we only observe the firms as to answer whether or not they intend on introducing an
innovation within the next one and a half years, implying whether or not T** falls into this
given time interval, i.e. T**<1.5. Therefore, we treat the optimal values of T** as continuous
latent variables and define
(22) T
iff T
iff T
D
=
>
≤R
S
|
T|0 15
1 15
, ** .
, ** .
 .
The structural equation for the latent variable is specified as
(23) T y u** '= +γ ,
where the exogenous variables are summarized in the vector y and the stochastic error term u
is added to account for the unknown starting points of the R&D projects and other unobserved
heterogeneities. This implies for our econometric model that a firm’s probability of
introducing an innovation within this given time period is a function of the explanatory
variables B, Z, V and v.
The conditional mean of the dependent variable is a linear function of the regressor variables
y, which is comparable to regression models. However, the dependent variable T** is not
observable. The only information we have is in which interval T** falls according to (22).
Thus, if we assume the error term u to be independently and normally distributed we obtain
the conditional probabilities of the random variable TD given the exogenous variables y:
                                               
2 If one extends the model by accounting for innovational rivalry in form of a positive Hazard rate that a rival
first succeeds in introducing the innovation, this last surprising result does not longer hold. Instead, a larger
reward V generally hastens the project development (see, Kamien, Schwartz 1982, p. 167).
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where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function. To identify the parameters the
variance σ2 has to be restricted to unity. In addition, the threshold value and the constant term
need to be combined so that
P T y yD = = −1 , 'γ γc h b gΦ .
With available observations from individual firms on TD and also on the regressor variables y,
we can formulate a likelihood function and maximize it with respect to parameter vector γ
(see, e.g. Ronning 1991, Ch. 2.4). Note, that common software packages estimate
P T y yD = =1 , 'β βc h b gΦ ,
implying that β γ= − . Thus, the opposite sign and significance of the parameter values can
directly be related to the comparative statics results of our theoretical model.
4.  The Data
The data set we use is one of the first attempts to gain information about firms’ innovative
behavior in the German private services sector. Comparable studies for the industrial sector
have a much longer tradition. The OSLO manual (OECD 1992) gives guidelines for business
surveys on this topic, especially designed for the industrial sector. Therefore, the Center for
European Economic Research (ZEW) in Mannheim has designed a questionnaire in
cooperation with infas (Bonn) and Fraunhofer ISI (Karlsruhe) to account for peculiarities of
services sector innovations. The survey was conducted in the Fall of 1995 and most questions
referred to 1994 or the time period from 1993 to 1995.
The survey contains responses of about 3.000 German service firms sampled from eight
branches, including wholesale trade, retail trade, communication and transportation, banking
and insurance, other financial services, software, technical counseling, and other private
services. These covered branches employed about 32% of the workforce in 1994. Further
service activities, which are not covered by the survey, employing another 25%, encompass
public services, education, health and social work, and some other personal services (for a
detailed description of the data refer to Licht et al. 1997).
One of the main topics in the survey is concerned with the realization of innovations in the
time period from 1993 to 1995. The respondents had to distinguish between product, process,
9and organizational innovations. However, the examples the firms gave, point to the fact that
this common distinction is not meaningful in the services sector (see also König et al., 1996).
Therefore, for our purposes, an innovator is defined as a firm that introduced at least one of
these three innovation categories. In our sample, 76.8% of the firms are innovators. The
questionnaire also contains a question whether the firms intend to introduce an innovation
over the next one and a half years. About 74.8% were planning to introduce at least one
innovation. This question corresponds to TD of (22) which will be treated as the dependent
variable in our econometric estimation.
The firms were also asked to assess some obstacles hindering the realization of innovation
projects in the past. A five-point Likert scale was provided in the questionnaire to indicate the
degree of obstruction the respondents faced with respect to a given aspect. The categories of
the Likert scale for a specific obstacle were ranked from to be of little importance (first
category) until to be of great importance (fifth category). Two questions on this topic were
concerned with the importance of financial constraints due to lack of equity funds and due to
lack of debt funds for the realization of their innovation projects in the last three years. These
two questions and four further obstacles are used in our empirical investgation to explain
planned innovative activities. For the econometric analysis, the five point Likert-scale
variables are transformed into dichotomous variables for which the means differentiated by
branches are recorded in Table 1. More details of these variables are given in the next section.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for our Data Sample
Branches No.
of
Obs
Innov.
plan
Lack
Equity
Funds
Lack
Debt
Funds
Innov.
in the
Past
Diffic.
in
Realiz.
Lack
Techn.
Equip.
Demand
Exp.
Demand
in the
Past
Wholesale Trade 411 71.3 17.6 13.6 70.2 8.5 3.4 49.9 43.8
Retail Trade 188 70.2 20.6 12.4 68.3 7.7 5.2 41.8 37.6
Communication,Transportation 316 67.7 27.6 15.7 74.8 10.7 4.4 52.9 53.5
Banking and Insurance 233 88.0 4.2 21.2 91.4 5.1 1.7 77.6 73.4
Other Financial Services 112 75.9 13.4 8.9 75.9 2.7 1.8 68.7 65.2
Software 133 90.2 33.6 23.1 87.9 11.9 2.2 78.8 57.6
Technical Counseling 246 72.8 26.5 20.7 81.0 10.0 3.2 46.7 54.5
Other private Services 796 74.6 18.3 10.9 75.6 7.0 3.5 58.9 59.1
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5.  Empirical Results
According to our theoretical model, we want to analyze the effects of financial constraints,
technological opportunities, profit expectations and current profits on the timing of
innovations. Therefore, we estimate univariate ordered probit models using the binary
information whether a firm plans on introducing at least one innovation within the next one
and a half years or not. The estimation results are recorded in Table 2. The two specifications
differ in how financial constraints are modeled.
In the first specification, a dummy variable for lack of equity funds is used which is equal to
one whenever this hampering effect is of great importance to the firm. In the second
specification, a dummy variable for lack of debt funds is used which is constructed in an
analogous manner. In both specifications the parameter for the financing constraints variable
is negative, but not significant in the second. According to our theoretical model, this implies
that a firm which is restricted by liquidity, has to postpone its optimal innovation date T**.
The parameter of past innovations is highly significant supporting the success breeds success
hypothesis as discussed by Mansfield (1968) and empirically investigated by e.g. Flaig,
Stadler (1994, 1998). Due to this hypothesis, successful innovations in the past confer
advantages in the technological opportunities that make a further innovation success more
likely.
The variables for the hampering effects, describing the technological opportunities, were
constructed analogously to the lack of financial funds variables. If a firm indicates that a
specific hampering factor was of great importance for the realization of innovation projects,
the dummy variable is set equal to one. The results indicate that in situations where
difficulties in the project realization occurred, technical equipment was lacking, the
innovation costs were very high, or technologies were not yet mature, the planned innovation
projects will be postponed. Not all parameters are significant, but they all show the expected
sign. The assessment of hampering factors with Likert scales is often criticized since the
answers for a certain question cannot be compared across firms. Respondents might be
subjectively biased when answering, even though they objectively face the same economic
conditions. Therefore, we calculated a mean variable from those hampering factors provided
in the data set which are not used in our empirical model. This variable is included to control
for the individual specific behavior when answering subjective assessment questions.
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Table 2: Binary Probit Estimations
Dependent Variable: Planned Innovations
Specification (1) Specification (2)
Explanatory Variables Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Lack of Equity Funds -0.166 * -1.76
Lack of Debt Funds -0.119 -0.86
Innovation in the Past 0.751 *** 11.09 0.757 *** 11.16
Difficulties in Project Realization -0.243 ** -2.03 -0.265 ** -2.21
Lack of Technical Equipment -0.278 * -1.64 -0.299 * -1.76
High Innovation Costs -0.092 -1.02 -0.105 -1.18
Innovation Technologies not Mature -0.170 -1.07 -0.160 -1.00
General Hampering Factors 0.274 *** 6.39 0.262 *** 6.17
Expected Demand 0.266 *** 3.38 0.242 *** 3.48
Expected. Demand*Lack of Equity F. 0.028 0.23
Expected. Demand*Lack of Debt F. 0.234 1.26
Past Demand -0.046 -0.58 -0.008 -0.11
Past. Demand*Lack of Equity Funds 0.031 0.25
Past. Demand*Lack of Debt Funds -0.147 -0.79
Log(Number of Employees) 0.178 *** 9.19 0.181 *** 9.39
Branches:
Wholesale Trade -0.318 ** -1.99 -0.322 ** -2.01
Retail Trade -0.403 ** -2.24 -0.418 ** -2.33
Communication and Transportation -0.520 *** -3.15 -0.524 *** -3.17
Banking and Insurance -0.074 -0.40 -0.073 -0.39
Other Financial Services Reference Reference
Software 0.338 1.56 0.323 1.49
Technical Counseling -0.309 * -1.81 -0.308 * -1.80
Other private Services -0.277 * -1.81 -0.281 * -1.84
East-Germany -0.007 -0.11 -0.016 -0.25
Const. -0.979 *** -5.34 -0.977 *** -5.34
Number of Observations 2426 2423
Log-Likelihood -1131.2 -1129.9
R2VZ 0.305 0.306
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. R2VZ is a (pseudo-)
coefficient of determination (Veall, Zimmermann 1996).
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Table 3: Indirect Inference Estimations with Equity Funds
Dependent Variable: Planned Innovations
Specification (1) Specification (2)
Explanatory Variables Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Lack of Equity Funds (ordinal) -0.161 ** -2.48
Lack of Equity Funds (nominal) -0.244 ** -2.41
Innovation in the Past 0.518 *** 9.60 0.503 *** 14.35
Difficulties in Project Realization -0.114 ** -2.33 -0.143 *** -3.18
Lack of Technical Equipment 0.057 *** 3.21 0.068 1.12
High Innovation Costs 0.064 1.39 0.034 0.49
Innovation Technologies not Mature -0.039 -0.78 -0.023 -0.44
General Hampering Factors 0.277 *** 3.90 0.276 *** 5.21
Expected Demand 0.128 *** 2.62 0.116 *** 4.05
Past Demand -0.034 -0.86 -0.024 -0.64
Log (Number of Employees) 0.115 *** 5.94 0.138 *** 7.26
Branches:
Wholesale Trade -0.346 * -1.74 -0.307 * -1.75
Retail Trade -0.351 -1.25 -0.353 * -1.88
Communication and Transportation -0.549 *** -3.08 -0.479 *** -3.03
Banking and Insurance -0.101 -0.61 -0.075 -0.33
Other Financial Services Reference Reference
Software 0.322 * 1.65 0.377 *** 2.62
Technical Counseling -0.325 ** -2.17 -0.289 -1.54
Other private Services -0.330 ** -2.27 -0.318 * -1.91
East-Germany -0.032 -0.50 -0.023 -0.42
Const. -0.142 -1.38 0.023 0.08
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Indirect Inference Estimations with Debt Funds
Dependent Variable: Planned Innovations
Specification (1) Specification (2)
Explanatory Variables Parameter t-value Parameter t-value
Lack of Debt Funds (ordinal) -0.091 -1.58
Lack of Debt Funds (nominal) -0.234 ** -2.10
Innovation in the Past 0.519 *** 8.50 0.494 *** 9.06
Difficulties in Project Realization -0.118 ** -2.51 -0.141 ** -2.53
Lack of Technical Equipment 0.049 * 1.80 0.001 0.01
High Innovation Costs 0.038 0.86 0.023 0.56
Innovation Technologies not Mature -0.023 -0.50 -0.017 -0.23
General Hampering Factors 0.258 *** 3.92 0.267 *** 2.91
Expected Demand 0.123 *** 2.65 0.188 *** 5.05
Past Demand -0.017 -0.49 -0.012 -0.40
Log (Number of Employees) 0.122 *** 7.57 0.130 *** 5.31
Branches:
Wholesale Trade -0.346 * -1.71 -0.217 -1.52
Retail Trade -0.364 -1.30 -0.258 ** -2.16
Communication and Transportation -0.564 *** -3.15 -0.413 * -1.85
Banking and Insurance -0.091 -0.54 0.005 0.02
Other Financial Services Reference Reference
Software 0.281 1.39 0.616 ** 2.55
Technical Counseling -0.319 ** -2.04 -0.186 -0.83
Other private Services -0.334 ** -2.25 -0.142 -0.63
East-Germany -0.063 -0.98 -0.028 -0.61
Const. -0.108 -1.11 -0.043 -0.14
Note: ***,**, and * indicate significance on a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
The theoretical model also suggests that expected profits influence the optimal timing of
innovations. However, our data set only offers information on firms’ expected demand. This
variable is measured on a five point Likert scale where the firms could indicate expected
changes from a large decrease (first category) to a large increase (fifth category). We again
constructed a dummy variables for increasing demand. The estimated parameter is positive
and highly significant. As a proxy for the variable current profits we use the firms’ responses
on past demand. The corresponding parameter has the correct sign, but is insignificant. In
order to distinguish the influence of expected and past demand in the different financial
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regimes, we included interaction variables each defined as demand variable times the lack of
funds variable. However, we could not find any significant effect of these indicators.
Schumpeter (1942) already suggested our finding that firm size, measured by the number of
employees, has a positive effect on firms’ innovation behavior which was often observed in
empirical studies in the industrial sector (see, e.g. the survey by Cohen 1995). In many other
aspects of service sector innovations, East-German firms are significantly different than West-
German firms. Surprisingly, this is not the case for the aspect we are focusing on.
The estimation strategy we followed so far is common practice in the sense that the scale of
the dependent variable is handled properly, whereas regressors are handled differently. With
regard to the left hand side of the econometric specification, the estimation method assumes a
latent variable for the observed categorical indicator. The right hand side variables are treated
differently. Although they are sampled in the same survey, it is common to construct dummy
variables for the ordinal scaled variables. Therefore, we apply an estimation procedure
developed in Kukuk (1998) which is based on the indirect inference method (Gourieroux et
al. 1993). In this approach each ordinal variable on the right hand side of the specification is
also seen as a manifestation of an underlying continuous variable which is unobservable. This
method uses simulation techniques to estimate the econometric model formulated in
continuous latent variables.
Therefore, in the next approach we are not using constructed variables for expected and past
demand and the obstacle variables. Instead, we use the whole ordinal information. In a first
step, we also used the ordinal information for the lack of funds variables but could not find
reasonable results. In Table 3 and Table 4, estimation results are given for the model where
we use the full ordinal information for the obstacles and the expected and past demand, but a
dichotomous variable for the lack of funds as defined in our first specification of Table 2. The
two specifications in Table 3 and Table 4 differ in the treatment of this dichotomous variable:
in the first column this variable is treated as an ordinal indicator, whereas in the second
column it is treated as a nominal indicator. The estimates for lack of technical equipment
show the wrong sign in the first specification. However, regarding the second specification,
all the variables are in accordance with our theoretical view. The lack of external funds
variable is highly significant in these approaches, supporting and even strengthening our
initial estimates in Table 2. However, the lack of funds variable should be seen as a nominal
information in the sense that either a firm is financially restricted or not. The idea that there
are differences in the degree of financial restriction is not supported by the data.
15
6.  Summary
In the theoretical model, we considered a firm which is planning the introduction of an
innovation. As a consequence, its old product and the implied profit stream is replaced by the
new product. The introduction date also depends on the costs of R&D since it is assumed that
the innovation requires a critical knowledge level to be accumulated over time. If R&D
expenditures cannot be financed internally, the company is financially constraint due to
adverse selection and moral hazard effects in the capital market. The model predicts a delay in
the introduction date of the innovation if the firm faces a liquidity constraint.
The model is estimated for firms in the German services sector using a cross section survey,
which was among the first to gain information on service sector innovations. Industrial
innovations were always seen as technological innovations implying large investment in
technical equipment and R&D knowledge. The service sector innovations might not all be
technical and R&D is not as institutionalized as in the industry, but innovation projects show
similarities in both sectors.
The empirical results show a significant effect of financing constraints on the timing of
introducing an innovation as implied by the theoretical model. All the variables used to
describe the knowledge level, which is necessary to innovate, show the predicted sign. Even
the two variables concerned with the technological aspects of the innovation project, show
parameter estimates underlining the similarity to industrial innovations. Other variables which
are included to control for issues not addressed in our theoretical model, show the same
results which are known from industrial innovation studies.
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